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Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) attacks are 
characterized by an explicit attempt to prevent legitimate users from access to a service. 
They pose a grave danger to Internet operation and cause significant financial damage 
every year, thus making it essential to devise effective techniques to defend against them. 
This thesis addresses this problem by proposing a new filtering traceback hybrid 
mechanism, which is shown to be an effective way to defend against DoS/DDoS attacks. 
Over the past few years, many countermeasures have been proposed for DoS/DDoS 
attacks . These approaches are broadly classified into four categories, namely prevention, 
detection, filtering and traceback. Many studies have shown that prevention methods can 
effectively prevent the attack from happening, detection and filtering can react to 
DoS/DDoS attacks in real time and traceback is feasible even after the DoS/DDoS attacks 
stop. However, few proposals address the issues of minimizing discarding legitimate 
traffic and link bandwidth consumption when the DoS/DDoS attack is raging on.  
In this thesis, I propose a Hybrid Traceback-Filtering-DoS (HTF-DoS) mechanism and its 
extended version, the Hybrid Traceback-Filtering-DDoS (HTF-DDoS) mechanism to use 
traceback to enhance packet filtering accuracy that minimizes dropping legitimate traffic . 
While the HTF-DoS mechanism is effective in simple DoS attack cases, the HTF-DDoS 
mechanism is feasible in distributed denial of service attack cases.  
In the two mechanisms, the packet-dropping function at routers is recursively activated 
hop-by-hop using traceback. In so doing, the bandwidth consumed by attack traffic in 
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upstream links is decreased as compared to other proposals where only routers on a hop 
away from the victim perform filtering. In HTF-DoS and HTF-DDoS, we use controlled 
flooding to reconstruct the attack path, and then filter packets which come from attack 
links only at the routers which are on the attack path. This minimizes the false positive 
ratio caused by imprecise filtering. To minimize the reaction delay against DoS attacks, 
packet-filtering and route-reconstruction are conducted simultaneously. 
Simulation results show that HTF-DoS and HTF-DDoS are able to drop 30% of bad 
packets at the start of the process and up to 100% when the traceback is completed in 
simple DoS cases and DDoS cases respectively.  Our simulation also shows that false 
positive ratios range from 15% to 0% at the beginning and end of the traceback-filtering 
process respectively. As a result, both the HTF-DoS and HTF-DDoS  mechanisms can 
improve the throughput of legitimate packets. Theoretical analysis of some types of graph 
topologies shows that our mechanism can save link bandwidth consumption. For instance, 
when there is only one attacker and the generation rate of bad packets is 500 times that of 
the good packets, the link bandwidth consumption can be saved by more than 56 percent. 
And when there are thirty attackers and the generation rate of bad packets per attacker is 
100 times that of the good packets, the link bandwidth consumption can be saved by more 
than 400 percent.
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
The widespread usage of the Internet and networking, whil e increasing productivity, 
efficiency and knowledge sharing, has resulted in additional problems in computer 
security. The increase in the vulnerability of systems connected to the Internet is not only 
because there are more systems available for attack, but also because there are more 
systems available from which the attack can be carried out. Also, advancement in 
technology has provided sophisticated attack tools, which can be used even by novices. 
DoS/DDoS [1] attacks take advantage of all the three weaknesses mentioned above.  
A DoS/DDoS attack is characterized by an explicit attempt to prevent legitimate users of 
a service from using these services. Examples of DoS/DDoS attacks include attempts to 
flood a network thereby preventing legitimate traffic  from passing through the flooded 
links, attempts to disrupt connections between two machines thereby preventing access to 
a service, and attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service.  
Distributed denial of service attacks against high-profile web sites such as Yahoo, CNN, 
Amazon and E* Trade in early 2000 [2] demonstrate how damaging DDoS attacks are, 
and how defenseless the Internet is under such attacks. The services of these web sites 
were unavailable for hours or even days as a result of the attacks. Since then, much work 
has been carried out to develop efficient countermeasures to defend against DoS /DDoS 
attacks. However, there are few proposals that address the issue of minimizing false 
positive ratio and link bandwidth consumption. This thesis addresses this issue. 
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1.1 Accomplishments and Contributions 
Our major contribution, which is elaborated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, is the 
development of an effective hybrid traceback-filtering mechanism called HTF-DoS and 
its extended version, named HTF-DDoS. The two mechanisms enhance packet filtering in 
conjunction with traceback in DoS and Distributed DoS respectively , and are able to 
minimize the false positive ratio and bandwidth consumption.  
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of DoS/DDoS attacks and its countermeasures. 
In Chapter 3, we present our approach to DoS defense mechanism which addresses the 
false positive ratio and link bandwidth consumption in DoS attacks . This protocol, named 
HTF-DoS uses traceback to propagate an increasingly refined filter for DoS. We show 
through simulations that our mechan ism is able to drop a large fraction of bad packets 
while keeping the false positive to a low value. As a result, our mechanism can improve 
the throughput of legitimate packets greatly. A theoretical analysis shows that our 
mechanism can also save link bandwidth consumption.  
In Chapter 4, we present HTF-DDoS, an extension of  the HTF-DoS mechanism to 
DDoS. We show by simulation and theoretical analysis that HTF-DDoS is also effective 
in dropping bad packets, keeping a low false-positive ratio, improving throughput of 
legitimate packets, and saving link bandwidth consumption in DDoS.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, w e present a summary of the various accomplishments and 
contributions of this study. We also outline several possible future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2  
DOS/DDOS ATTACKS AND 
COUNTERMEASURES 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is a kind of attack which explicitly attempts to consume 
the resources of a host or network, thereby prevent ing legitimate users from accessing 
these services. The attackers typically send a huge amount of seemingly legitimate traffic 
to the victim to request for services, and in so doing, result in the significant consumption 
of CPU cycles or memory of the target host, or the bandwidth of the target network. Such 
attacks essentially disable the target host or target network from providing service to 
legitimate users.  
Based on the number of attacking hosts deployed by the attacker to implement the attack, 
the attack can be classified into two categories ---DoS attack and Distributed DoS attack 
(DDoS). A DDoS attack is a simple variation of a DoS  attack. In DoS attacks, a single 
attacker consumes all the available bandwidth by generating a large number of packets 
operating from a single host while in the distributed cases multiple attackers coordinate 
together to produce the same effect from several hosts on the network. Because of the 
availability of automated tools that made it easy for unsophisticated attacker to conduct 
DoS/DDoS attacks, DoS/DDoS attack has become widespread [3]. With the emergence of 
E-commerce, the DoS /DDoS threat is becoming a serious problem which affects E-
commerce service’s availability. The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the 
Internet's leading security watchdog, warns that Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks pose a major threat to e-commerce and e-business in the future [4]. Once under 
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attack, the E-commerce servers are out of service for some time and no legitimate clients 
can access the servers. This eventually results in loss of business, time and money for 
both clients and enterprises. 
In DoS/DDoS attacks, the attackers typically put spoofed source address in the IP header 
of attack packets. This is known as “IP source address Spoofing” [5] or simply “IP-
spoofing”. With IP spoofing, the attacker can easily prevent itself from being identified, 
filtered and traced back by the victim. The difficulty in identifying the genuine source of 
DoS/DDoS attackers makes it much harder to stop DoS/DDoS attacks and to institute 
accountability. Traceback is another type of countermeasures that attempts to identify the 
true IP address of the attacker and the path taken by the attack packets.  
In section 1, we present several kinds of (Distributed) DoS  attacks. Then in section 2 we 
introduce the countermeasures against DoS attacks  and new approaches in this area. 
2.1  DoS/DDoS Attacks 
DoS/DDoS attacks aim to deny or limit the legitimate users’ access to a certain host or 
network. Based on the different objective of a DoS/DDoS attack, we can classify the 
attacks into two categories, namely flood attacks and logic or software attacks [6]. In 
flood attacks, an Internet host is overwhelmed by a continuous flood of traffic designed to 
consume resources at the targeted server (CPU cycles and memory) and/or in the network 
(bandwidth and packet buffers). These attacks result in degraded service or a complete 
site shutdown.  The SYN Flood attack [7], Smurf IP attack [8], and the UDP Flood attack 
[9] are all well-known example of flood DoS/DDoS attack. While in software or logic  
attacks, a small number of malformed packets are designed to exploit known software 
bugs on the target system. These attacks are relatively easy to counter either through the 
installation of software patches that eliminate the vulnerabilities or by adding specialized 
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firewall rules to filter out malformed packets before they reach the target system . A well-
known example is Ping of Death attack [10]. We describe each of these attacks in the 
following sections. 
2.1.1 SYN Flood Attack  
The SYN Flood attack is one of the most common attacks used to deny legitimate TCP 
connection to a server. This attack takes advantage of the vulnerability in the working 
mechanism of the TCP 3-way handshake protocol [11] used in the connection phase of 
TCP protocol. The client initiates the connection and sends a TCP SYN packet to the 
server. In a TCP SYN packet, the source address of the client is included in the packet 
header. Upon the receipt of the TCP SYN packet, the server sends a SYN-ACK packet to 
the source address marked on the TCP SYN packet header. At the same time the server 
allocates a connection buffer record, storing information for the connection which is 
waiting to be completed in the connection queue. When the client receives the SYN-ACK 
packets, an ACK packet is sent out to the server and this completes the connection 
establishment. This message exchange is called a three-way handshake.  
 
Figure 2.1 TCP 3-way handshake protocol 
 
The potential for abuse lies in the allocation of a data structure describing all pending 
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connections. This data structure is of finite size, and it can be made to overflow by 
intentionally creating too many half-open connections (connections whose three way 
handshake has not completed yet), then the system will be unable to accept any new 
incoming connections until the table is emptied out. During a TCP SYN Flood attack, the 
attacker sends a large number of TCP SYN packets with a spoofed source address to the 
server. Upon receipt of those TCP SYN packets, the server allocates buffer space for each 
half-open connection until the connection establishment is completed. Because the source 
address in the TCP SYN packet is spoofed, no ACK packet is sent out and the connection 
is always in half -open states, so that the buffer space allocated will not be released. 
Because the attacker generates a multitude of half-open connections, the half-open 
connections data structure on the victim server system will eventually fill and no more 
incoming connections can be accepted.  
There is no acceptable solution to this problem with the current IP protocol technology. 
However, one way to avoid this kind of attacks is to install filter in routers which can 
reduce the number of spoofed IP packets entering and exiting the network.  In addition, 
SYN cookies [12] can also be used as another countermeasure against SYN floods. The 
three-way handshake requires the sequence number to match between the SYN-ACK and 
ACK packet to protect against accidentally reopened old connections and unauthorized 
access. SYN cookies calculate the sequence number as a cryptographic hash value of 
source address, source port, destination addres s, destination port, and a destination 
specific secret key. A server that uses SYN cookies doesn’t have to drop connections 
when its SYN queue fills up. Instead, it sends back the sequence number calculated in the 
cryptographic way to the requesting client, and the state is not kept in the SYN queue. On 
a result, the SYN queue is not exhausted and normal TCP communication can continue. 
When the server receives an ACK, it recalculates the sequence number by using its secret 
key, the addresses and the ports. If the sequence number recalculated by the receiver 
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matches the one calculated by the requesting host, the receiver rebuilds the SYN queue 
entry then. SYN cookies are now a standard part of Linux. However, they are not enabled 
by default under Linux. To enable them, we need to add a command to the boot scripts 
[13]. In [14], Schuba develops a software tool synkill that can lessen the impact of SYN 
flooding attacks by generating RST packets or ACK packets to the victim. The RST 
packets and ACK packets can release the resources allocated at the victim for the 
connection establishments. Those actions are in response to observed traffic and the 
decision making is based on a synkill finite state machine which has four states classified 
by the source IP addresses of TCP packets-GOOD, NULL, BAD and NEW respectively. 
NULL means never seen hosts; Good means belonging to correctly behaving hosts; NEW 
means potentially spoofed addresses; and BAD means most certainly spoofed addresses.  
2.1.2 UDP Flood Attack  
UDP is a connectionless protocol which does not require any connection setup procedure 
to transfer data. The UDP flooding attack targets computers providing UDP services. A 
UDP Flood attack is usually based on UDP ECHO and character generator service 
(chargen) [15] provided by most computers on the network. Chargen service and echo 
service are both designed for some performance-testing network programs. Chargen 
service generates a stream of characters for each packet it receives while Echo service 
echoes any character it received [16]. When the attacker uses some forged UDP packets 
to hook up one system’s echo service with another system’s chargen service, a flood of 
data passes between the two systems, and the network bandwidth is soon exhausted. And 
the service provided in the network is denied due to serious congestion.  
There is no perfect solution to defeat UDP flood attacks. Recommendations particularly 
include disabling useless UDP services and blocking UDP ports at firewalls. However, if 
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one really needs to provide these services, then he cannot protect them. He needs to 
monitor activity on UDP ports for signs of misuse.  
2.1.3 Smurf Attack  
ICMP [17] is a protocol used to provide feedback about problems in communication 
environment. For example, it delivers information about network errors and congestion, it 
helps to troubleshoot, and it reports IP packet timeouts. ICMP allows checking if a host 
on a network is responding by sending it an ICMP-ECHO packet.  On receipt of an 
ICMP-ECHO reply packet from the remote host, one can measure the availability and 
maximum delay time from the remote host.  The Smurf attack is a reflector attack that 
takes advantage of the ICMP-ECHO mechanism. In a Smurf attack, the attacker uses 
broadcast IP addresses to increase the effect of an attack. Broadcast IP addresses are used 
to send messages to all the hosts connected to a particular network and they are usually 
formed by setting all the bits of their host part to 1. By sending a message to a broadcast 
address, an attacker ensures that the message will be received by many hosts. If these 
messages require a response, then the attacker will generate a high number of messages as 
well the hosts will reply. Thus a multitude of machines in this network will receive 
ICMP_ECHO request and reply to the victim, soon the victim’s network is overwhelmed.  
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Figure 2.2 Smurf Attack 
 
Unfortunately, there is no easy defensive solution for victims receiving the potentially 
large number of ICMP echo reply packets. However, we can prevent the smurf attack 
from occurring to some extent by preventing a site from being used as an intermediary in 
the attack. The way is to disable IP directed-broadcasts at the routers. By disabling these 
broadcasts, we can configure the routers to deny IP broadcast traffic onto our network 
from other networks, and which avoids the attack process to some extent.  
2.1.4 PING of Death Attack 
Ping of death is a DoS attack caused by an attacker deliberately sending an IP packet 
larger than the 65,536 bytes allowed by the IP protocol. One of the features of TCP/IP is 
fragmentation; it allows a single IP packet to be broken down into smaller segments. In 
1996, attackers began to take advantage of that feature when they found that a packet 
broken down into fragments could add up to more than the allowed 65,536 bytes [18]. 
When an attacker sends an ICMP ECHO request packet that is much larger than the 
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maximum IP packet size to the victim, since the received ICMP echo request packet is 
bigger than the normal IP packet size, the victim cannot reassemble the packets and the 
operating system will freeze, crash or reboot. 
For defending against the ping of death attack, the best line of defense it to keep the 
system patched up. By the end of 1997, operating system vendors had made patches 
available to avoid the ping of death. In addition, many Web sites block Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP) ping messages at their firewalls to prevent any future 
variations of this kind of denial of service attack.  
 
Figure 2.3 Ping of Death Attack 
2.2 Taxonomy of DoS/DDoS Countermeasures 
From their early days, DDoS  attacks have attracted a lot of attention in the research and 
commercial communities. Many security efforts aim at identifying a certain feature of the 
attacks to prevent them or to constrain their effect. Generally, the countermeasures can be 
categorized into four categories: Prevention, Detection, Filtering and Traceback. Figure 




Figure 2.4 Taxonomy of DoS/DDoS Countermeasures  
 
2.2.1 Prevention 
Currently, there are many ways that can effectively prevent DoS/DDoS from happening.  
l Authentication : The inability to authenticate the true source of an originating packet 
in the TCP/IP protocol suite is an important reason for DoS/DDoS attack occurring. The 
attacker can easily forge a packet with false source address. A TCP SYN Flood attacker 
takes advantage of it to send TCP SYN packets with faked source address to the victim. A 
more effective authentication mechanism may prevent the attack from happening to some 
extent. 
l Simplification: Simplification means enabling only essentially services and 
disabling the rest. Any vulnerability in redundant services may be used by the attackers to 
conduct DDoS attacks. As we have mentioned before, we may disable the chargen, echo 
and other unused UDP services to prevent from UDP flooding attack. And to prevent the 
Smurf attack we can disable IP-directed broadcast at router s.  
l Zombie Alert: Before conducting a DDoS attack, the attacker needs to select several 
hosts in the Internet to help perform the attack. The selected hosts are then installed with 
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a DDoS attack program. We call these hosts “zombies” because once they are corrupted. 
They become unwitting attackers [19]. The availability of zombies is indispensable for 
the attacker to launch a DDoS attack. If all hosts on the Internet can be prevented from 
being compromised, a DDoS attack is much harder  to carry out. To guard against 
DoS/DDoS attacks, hosts must be updated with the latest security patches. Hence we can 
protect hosts from being used as zombies by the attacker and prevent DDoS attacks to 
some extent.  
l Regular Monitoring: We can monitor server CPU load and network bandwidth 
utilization regularly. Once an abnormal pattern is detected, we should check whether an 
attack is occurring or whether the host is compromised.  
l System Configuration: We can decrease the timeout value for the receipt of TCP 
ACK packet which will help in pruning half-open connections from the SYN queue. This 
may help to prevent TCP SYN attacks. In addition, significantly increasing the length of 
the SYN queue may also help the system cope with more simultaneous half-open 
connections.  
l Ingress Filtering: Preventing IP-spoofing is a key defense against DoS attacks. If 
we can successfully block specific IP addresses or IP address range, then we can 
effectively perturb the DoS/DDoS attack. The good way to address the problem of 
anonymous attacks is ingress filter ing which can reduce the ability to forge source 
address. The concept of Ingress filtering was proposed in RFC 2827 [5].  The idea of 
Ingress filtering is to configure routers to block packets that arrive with invalid source 
addresses  to reduce or completely eliminate the attacker’s ability to use forged source 
addresses. Ingress filtering requires a router with sufficient power to examine the source 
address of every packet and sufficient knowledge to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate addresses. If Ingress filtering can be accomplished successfully, it would 
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ultimately result in much easier tracing back to the true source of an attack and as such 
would serve as a significant deterrent for attackers. However , some limitations of the 
approach still exist. Firstly, it may be the case that an address is forged, but it is still a 
valid address that corresponds to that of another host on the same network and it cannot 
be detected. Secondly, the approach when applied to high speed links can become an 
expensive operation and may reduce network bandwidth. The third drawback is that 
ingress filtering relies heavily on widespread deployment in the routers in order to be 
effective. Unfortunately, a significant fraction of ISPs, perhaps the majority, do not 
implement this service either because they are uninformed or have been discouraged by 
the administrative burden, potential router overhead and complications with services such 
as mobile IP [20]. Unless these problems are resolved, there is still a significant need for 
traceback technology.  
2.2.2 Detection  
As prevention mechanisms can not provide one hundred percent guarantee, DoS attacks 
still occur. A critical problem is how to detect the attack quickly and accurately. Usually 
we use intrusion detection systems (IDS) which can inform us immediately about any 
suspicious activity, the presence of an intruder, and help to provide accountability for the 
attacker's actions. 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [21] is responsible for detecting inappropriate or 
other data occurring on a network that may be considered unauthorized.  An IDS captures 
and inspects all traffic, regardless of whether it's permitted or not. Based on the contents, 
at either the IP or application level, an alert is generated. For instance, Snort [22] is a 
simple IDS which currently includes the ability to detect more than 1100 potential 
vulnerabilities. Intrusion Detection Systems can monitor the network for known attack 
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signatures. An attack signature or packet format is a sequence of events, which is known 
to occur prior to or during an attack. Therefore, there is no way of knowing the attack 
signature until at least one site has been attacked.  
Besides some feasible tools (snort, etc) several approaches on how to detect Denial of 
Service more efficiently and accurately have been proposed recently.  
In [23], Hussain proposes an attack fingerprinting system to identify instances of repeated 
attack scenarios by spectral analysis of the arrival stream of attack traffic. To make this 
identification, firstly, Hussain filters the attack packets and create an attack fingerprint 
which can be uniquely mapped as a multivariate probability density function 
corresponding to the attack scenario. The power spectral density is computed by 
performing the discrete-time Fourier transform on the autocorrelation function (ACF) of 
the attack segment [23] and is derived from the characteristics of the attack stream which 
is shaped by many factors: number of attackers, attack tool, operating system, host CPU, 
network speed, host load, and network cross-traffic. Secondly, Hussain uses the Bayes 
maximum-likelihood classifier [23] to test if the current attack scenario is similar to a 
previously registered attack fingerprint in the database.  
In [24], Haining Wang and Danlu Zhang propose a simple and robust mechanism for 
detecting SYN flooding attacks. The mechanism utilizes the inherent TCP SYN-FIN 
pairs’ behavior for SYN flooding detection. According to the specification of TCP/IP 
protocol, in normal operation, a FIN packet is paired with a SYN packet at the end of data 
transmission. (The SYN/FIN packets delimit the beginning and end of each TCP 
connection.) However, under SYN flooding attacks, this SYN-FIN pairs’ behavior is 
violated and the strong positive correlation between SYN and FIN packets offers a clear 
indication for SYN flooding.  
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2.2.3 Filtering  
Filtering is an effective way to defend against DoS attacks when the attack is in progress. 
It attempts to mitigate the effect of DoS attack by dropping bad packets. The main 
components of a filtering approach are the establishment of filtering rules and the 
installation of a filtering module. The former focuses on setting the most efficient set of 
filtering rules and its main task is to identify attack packets from good ones prec isely. By 
preferably dropping attack packets, the attack stream can be stopped. A proper set of 
filtering rules should prevent good streams from collateral damage at best. The 
installation of filtering module is responsible for setting the filtering function in those 
routers that can filter most effectively.  Some filtering mechanisms [25] [26] [27] have 
been proposed. In [25], Mahajan proposes an aggregation-based filtering mechanism 
where the routers preferably drop packets belonging to high-bandwidth aggregates. In 
[26], Sung proposes a traceback-based filtering mechanism where the routers 
preferentially drop packets coming from the attack path. (Details of [25] [26] will be 
given in chapter 3). In [27], Yau proposes a Max-min Fair Server -centric router throttles 
mechanism. The basic idea of this mechanism is for a server under stress to install a 
router throttle at selected upstream routers. By asking the selected routers to  regulate 
their own contributing packet rates to more moderate levels, the mechanism can forestall 
an impending attack. The throttle rates in distributed routing points can be dynamically 
adjusted. If the current throttle fails to bring down the load effectively, the throttle is 
reduced, and otherwise increased.  
2.2.4 Traceback 
Prevention is employed before the occurring of an attack and filtering is used during the 
attack. Traceback is another kind of countermeasure against the DoS attack. Traceback is 
usually conducted during or after the attack. Traceback can trace the true location of the 
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attacker and help in gathering evidence for law enforcement. But the inability to 
authenticate the true source of an originating packet [28] addresses us a great difficult to 
trace back to the attacker. Some practical and efficient trace back methods have been 
proposed. In [29], Bellovin proposes an ICMP traceback technique in which whenever a 
router forwards an IP packet, it generates an ICMP packet, called ICMP Traceback, with 
a low probability and sends it to the same destination address as the IP packet with 
information about the router’s backward or forward links or both. Upon reception of a 
sufficient number of ICMP Traceback packets, the victim can reconstruct the attack path 
and determine the true IP address of the attacker .  
Probabilistic packet marking (PPM) is a traceback method that was first proposed by 
Savage in [31]. In PPM, routers probabilistically add partial path information in the 
packets that are forwarded. This information is typically added in the 16-bits 
Identification field in the IP header. When the victim detects an attack, it can reconstruct 
the attack path using a sufficient number of marked packets received. In [32], Burch and 
Cheswick describe a link-testing traceback method. In this  method, the victim is assumed 
to know the network topology.  By selectively flooding the various links, the victim can 
infer the links that carry the attack traffic. This is done by observing how the controlled-
flooding perturbs the attack traffic at the victim end. Logging is another  way to traceback 
the real attacker which was proposed in [33]. The basic idea of this approach is that every 
router stores a record of every forwarded packet. When a victim is attacked, it queries the 
routers to determine the ones that have forwarded the attack packets so as to determine 
the attack path. The current solutions can be broadly grouped into four categories: link 
testing, ICMP traceback, probabilistic marking and logging.  
2.2.4.1 Link Testing  
Controlled f looding [32] is an ingenious method to trace the source of spoofed attack 
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traffic. The victim selectively floods links in the network and by observing whether  the 
attack traffic is perturbed at the victim, the attack links can be identified. Usually, 
controlled- flooding is started from the links nearest to the victim, then recursively 
applied to upstream links. How to produce an effective and powerful load to make 
obvious attack perturbation is the key challenge in controlled flooding. Suggested by 
Burch in [32], the best way is to use the UDP chargen service available on the routers. 
The Chargen service generates continuous data to anyone who connects to it and the rate 
of data flow is limited in general by the rate data being acknowledged by the client 
machine. Though the chargen service is turned off on many Internet hosts and routers, 
there are still many hosts with the service turned on, and they are easy to find. Before 
loading a link, cooperative hosts at the right places in the network map in order to 
produce the required load must be identified. The ideal routers are those which turn on the 
chargen service and are also on the far end of the link under test as seen from the victim. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, when we want to load the link R7-R8 that is on the attack 
path, routers R4 and R2 that provide the Chargen services should be identified first. Then 
we spoof the source addresses of the UDP chargen packets to be the address of router R8. 
As a result, the chargen response packets will seriously congest the link R7-R8.  
Though many traceback approaches have been proposed, most of them require the tedious 
continued attention and cooperation of each intermediate Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
for tracing. This is not always easy given the worldwide scope of the Internet. However, 
controlled flooding can trace spoofed packets to their actual source host without relying 
on the cooperation of intervening ISPs. This is a great advantage of controlled flooding. 
However, to effectively load a link, victim must resort to some assistance from the hosts 
or routers in the Internet, as it is difficult to generate a flow of packets from a single host 
[8]. Controlled flooding is itself a kind of DoS attack that will influence the legitimate 
users during traceback.  
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Figure 2.5 Controlled-Flooding Mechanism 
 
2.2.4.2 ICMP Traceback  
In the Internet draft [29], Bellovin proposes an ICMP traceback technique where each 
router picks one packet out of a large amount of IP packets, (say one out of 20,000) and 
generates a new ICMP packet intended for the same destination address as the selected 
packet. In those ICMP packets, some information about the back or forward link or both 
of them is included. With the receipt of a sufficient number of such ICMP packets, the 
victim can reconstruct the attack path from the information included in them. Another 
important ICMP traceback scheme called intention-driven ICMP traceback was proposed 
by Allsion Mankin in [34]. Intension-driven ICMP traceback is a simple enhancement to 
the IETF draft which introduces an extra bit in the routing and forwarding process to 
improve the probability that a router sends valuable ICMP packets.  Mankin finds that a 
router cannot always pick up the attack ones to send ICMP packets for instead the router 
usually tends to pick up some innocent ones due to a potentially large amount of noisy 
background traffic passing through the routers at the same time. Those ICMP packets 
corresponding to the innocent packets will be sent to non-victims and become invaluable 
and usefulness. Usually, the closer the router is to the victim, the higher the probability 
the router can send the packets to the victim. On the other hand, the routers closer to the 
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attacker might send ICMP packets to non-victims with a higher probability. So the author 
proposes an evaluation model to evaluate the value of each ICMP packet before sending 
them out. Then an intention bit which indicates whether or not the network node is 
interested in receiving the ICMP messages is introduced. It is added in the BGP routing 
table and only when the intention bit for a particular route entry is 1, the ICMP packet 
will be sent. The special intention value can be propagated to routers through Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) updates, thus the probability for a victim to receiving ICMP 
traceback packets from remote routers is increased. Two modules in this mechanism 
(Itrace generation and decision module) generate ICMP packets only to those routers that 
want to receive them and set the intention bit as 1, and try to choose the farther one to the 
victim out of those willing to receive it. Thus the probability for a router to generate 
valuable and useful ICMP packets is raised. So we can do traceback more effectively. In 
[30] Henry Lee proposes an enhanced ICMP Traceback scheme, called ITrace-CP (ICMP 
Traceback with Cumulative Path) that encodes the cumulative attack path information in 
the ICMP Traceback message. The ITrace-CP scheme is able to reconstruct the attack 
path with fewer attack packets.  
2.2.4.3 Probabilistic Packet Marking  
The key idea of PPM is to probabilistically mark packets at routers (over which the 
attackers have no control) with partial path information. Once an attack is detected, the 
entire path could be reconstructed post-mortem at the victim with the receipt of sufficient 
marked packets. One of the earliest efforts to identify the source of the packet through 
PPM was done by Savage [31]. The approach allows a victim to identify the network path 
traversed by the attack packets without requiring interactive operational support from 
Internet Service Providers. In the marking procedure, the 16 bit identification field in the 
IP header is used to record a hop count and an edge-id which is the XOR value (32 bits) 
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of the two IP addresses of adjacent routers. To reduce the per-packet space requirements, 
Savage suggests subdividing each edge-id into a few smaller non-overlapping fragments. 
Consequently, the choice for apportioning the identification field is follows: 3 offset bits 
to present 8 possible fragments, 5 bits to represent the distance, and 8 bits for the edge 
fragment. In [37], the algorithm uses  a 32-bit hash, which doubles the size of each router 
address to 64 bits. This implies that 8 separate fragments are needed to represent each 
edge which is indicated by a unique offset value. After the PPM scheme was proposed 
[31], a number of papers have been published which try to improve the performance of 
that basic scheme. For example, in [35], Song and Perrig propose two new schemes, the 
advanced marking scheme and the authenticated marking scheme for tracing back the 
approximate origin of spoofed IP packets. In the advanced marking scheme, instead of 
encoding the full IP address of a router into eight fragments as in [31], they simply 
encode its hash value.  The 16-bit IP identification field is divided into a 5-bit distance 
field and an 11-bit edge field. The advanced marking scheme results in lower 
computational overhead for the victim to reconstruct the attach paths under large-scale 
distributed DoS attacks. However, it cannot prevent a compromised router from forging 
the markings of other uncompromised upstream routers. The authenticated marking 
scheme solves this problem by authenticating the packet marking. In the process of packet 
marking authentication, cryptographic MAC (Message Authentication Code) is used. 
Each router shares a unique secret key with the victim and instead of sending the router 
address; the router sends a MAC which is a function of its IP  address and packet-specific 
information, and its own secret key to the victim. This presents the compromised router 
from creating forged packet marking.  
Different from the PPM scheme [31] [35] that uses a fixed marking probability, Tao Peng 
proposes an adjusted PPM scheme in [36]. In this scheme, the marking probability is 
adjusted in each router according to the distance between the router and the victim, so that 
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the victim receives packets marked by each router  with equal probability. As packets 
further from the destination victim have a higher probability of being overwritten, the 
marking probability should increase with increasing distance from the destination. The 
new scheme successfully reduces the number of packets needed to reconstruct the attack 
path by 40% compared to uniform PPM.  
In approach [37], Franklin  reframes the traceback problem as a polynomial reconstruction 
problem and uses techniques from algebraic coding theory to provide robust methods of 
transmission and reconstruction. The number of IP authentication header s is reduced from 
16 to 13. This scheme does not require an upstream router map to reconstruct the attack 
path, but it is very vulnerable to fake markings put in the packets by the attackers.  
Goodrich presents another approach to do PPM traceback which is called randomized-
and-link in [38]. In this scheme, checksum cords are used to "link" message fragments in 
a way that is highly scalable, for the checksums serve both as associative addresses and 
data integrity verifiers. The main advantage of these checksum cords is that they spread 
the addresses of possible router messages across a spectrum that is too large for the 
attacker to easily create messages that collide with legitimate messages. Therefore the 
methods scale to attack trees containing hundreds of routers and do not require that a 
victim know the topology of the routers a priori. In addition, by utilizing authenticated 
dictionaries in a novel way, the methods do not require routers to sign any setup message 
individually.  Also there are some studies focusing on the tradeoffs for various parameters 
in conventional PPM. In [39], Abraham Yaar proposes a novel packet marking approach 
in which a path fingerprint is embedded in each packet, enabling a victim to identify 
packets traversing the same paths through the Internet on a per packet basis, regardless of 
source IP address spoofing and which is called Path Identifier (PI). In this per -packet 
deterministic mechanism each packet traveling along the same path carries the same 
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identifier. This allows the victim to take a proactive role in defending against a DDoS 
attack by using the PI mark to filter out packets matching the attackers’ identifiers. 
2.2.4.4 Logging  
The basic idea of logging is that the routers store the actual contents of every packet 
passing through the router, so tha t the victim can trace back the origin of the packet by 
using the history in the router. The drawback with logging approach is that it requires 
additional storage at the routers. To reduce the low storage requirement, Snoeren 
proposes a hash-based Source P ath Isolation Engine (SPIE) [33] to enable IP traceback by 
storing packet digests instead of the actual packet contents in the routers. This can also 
preserve traffic confidentiality as SPIE is prevented from being used as a tool for 
eavesdropping. Sneoeren’s research shows that the first 24 invariant bytes of a packet 
(20-byte IP header with 4 bytes masked out plus the first 8 bytes of payload) are sufficient 
to differentiate almost all non-identical packets, thus SPIE computes digests over the 24 
bytes.  If a packet is determined to be offensive by some intrusion detection system, a 
query is dispatched to SPIE which in turn queries routers for packet digests of the 
relevant time periods. The query information includes a packet, victim and the time of 
attack. The results of this query are used to build an attack graph that indicates the 
packet’s source.  
2.3 Summary  
Denial of Service is a kind of attack which attempts to deny the users from legitimate 
service or just disrupt a service. Based on the scale of DoS attack, DoS attacks fall into 
two categories which are simple DoS and Distributed Denial of Service. While a simple 
DoS attack only involves one attacker, a DDoS attacker uses numerous coordinated hosts 
to carry out the attack. In this kind of attacks, the real attacker commands a set of 
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compromised hosts to make them execute an attack against a single target, thus 
multiplying the effectiveness of the attack. There are many kinds of DoS attacks and we 
classify the attacks into two categories: host-based attacks and network-based attacks. In 
host-based attacks, the attacker aims to crash the server by exhausting the server’s 
resources, such as its CPU utilization, memory or file storage. SYN Flood Attack is a 
well-known example. While in network-based attacks, the attacker tries to consume all 
available network bandwidth connecting the target to the rest of the Internet by sending 
plenty of useless packets to the host. Well-known examples include UDP Flood Attack, 
Smurf IP Attack, and ICMP Flood Attack. The serious consequence that DoS attack 
brings has gained more and more attention in both the research and commercial 
communities. Many effective countermeasures have been developed. The main 
countermeasures include prevention, detection, filtering and traceback.  Prevention 
method is carried out prior to the occurring of the attack and there are many ways to 
prevent the attack from happening in advance. Ingress/Egress filtering, authentication, 
simplification and configuration etc are all effective in attack prevention. Detection and 
filtering are another ways to defend against DoS attacks and they usually are conducted 
when DoS attack is raging on. Intrusion Detection System is a widely implemented 
system in detecting attacks. Traceback is an after-term defense mechanism and many 
different approaches have been proposed. There are four common kinds of traceback 
methods which are link testing, logging, PPM and ICMP traceback. 
In this chapter, we have introduced several common kinds of (Distributed) DoS  attacks- 
SYN Flood Attack, UDP Flood Attack, Smurf IP Attack, and ICMP Flood Attack 
respectively.  And we have also introduced the countermeasures  against DoS attacks from 
the aspect of prevention, detection, filtering and traceback respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HTF - DOS VERSION 
In this chapter we propose the Hybrid Traceback-Filtering (HTF) DoS defense 
mechanism that is able to improve the throughput of legitimate traffic with minimum 
collateral damage and bandwidth consumption in upstream links. This mechanism 
leverages  on the attack path constructed by the controlled flooding traceback method [32] 
to enable the routers to filter intelligently. The controlled flooding scheme selectively 
floods links based on the network topology, then identifies the attack links by observing 
whether the attack stream is perturbed by the flooding. With the knowledge of the whole 
or partial attack path, the scheme recursively activates a filtering function in the routers 
that are on the attack path. By filtering out the packets coming from attack links in chosen 
routers, the attack stream can be effectively controlled while protecting the legitimate 
traffic. Compared to conventional approaches where filtering is only effected at a single 
level of routers, our mechanism can save bandwidth in upstream links effectively when 
filtering on routers further away from the victim are activated. To evaluate its 
effectiveness in defending against DoS attacks, the scheme is simulated in ns2 [40]. 
Simulation results show that the throughput of the legitimate traffic is increased while the 
false positive ratio and upstream link bandwidth consumption decrease. This approach 
can mitigate the effect of DoS attacks in real time, as the filtering function is activated 
immediately  once the first attack link is identified.  
Section 3.1 introduces a few related works. Section 3.2 gives an overview  of the hybrid 
mechanism. In section 3.3 we evaluate the performance of our mechanism. Section 3.4 
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concludes the chapter.  
3.1 Related Work  
In [25], Mahajan and Bellovin propose an aggregate-based filtering mechanism where the 
congested aggregates (high-bandwidth aggregates) are in fact responsible for congestion 
is an assumption. The idea behind this approach is to identify the signature of the high-
bandwidth aggregates, and then preferentially drop packets belonging to these aggregates 
in routers. An aggregate is a collection of packets from one or more flows that have some 
properties in common and the property could be anything from destination or source 
address prefixes to a certain application type (streaming video, for instance). The 
aggregate-based Congestion Control (ACC) module in each router identifies the 
signatures of the congested aggregates by analyzing the statistics of dropped packets, and 
then drops the packets with the congest signatures. The authors also extend the simple 
ACC mechanism to a Pushback form. In pushback, a filtering request is recursively 
propagated from downstream routers to upstream routers hop-by-hop. The bandwidth of 
upstream links is saved as bad packets are dropped in upstream routers before arriving at 
downstream routers; however, the whole procedure is complex. Firstly, in [25], to decide 
which upstream router should filter, a downstream router needs to contact all its upstream 
routers to identify which one(s) contributes the major part of the traffic load. This 
consumes a lot of computational resource at the routers and leads to link bandwidth 
consumption in the transfer of contact information (dummy packets and status packets) 
between upstream and downstream routers. Secondly, identifying the signature of high-
bandwidth aggregates is resource-consuming as much work needs to be done in 
information extraction and analysis of dropped packets.  
In [26], Sung proposes a technique which leverages on the information concerning 
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whether a network edge is on the attacking path of an attacker (“infected”) or not 
(“clean”). While an attacker will have all the edges on its path marked as “infected”, 
edges on the path of a legitimate client will mostly be “clean”. By preferentially filtering 
packets that are inscribed with the hash value marks of “infected” edges, the proposed 
scheme attempts to remove most of the DoS traffic while affecting legitimate traffic only 
slightly. However, in this method the victim relies on the receipt of a large number of 
attack packets to identify an attack edge, which brings about a high reactive delay against 
DoS attacks if the probability for routers to mark packets is not high. Meanwhile, as the 
malicious packets will traverse a lot of upstream links before reaching the two-hop-away 
routers, the upstream link bandwidth cannot be effectively saved.  
3.2 Overview of HTF-DoS 
In this section, we propose a controlled flooding-filtering hybrid traceback-filtering 
mechanism (HTF). The idea of this mechanism is to preferentially drop packets coming 
from attack links in the routers which are on the attack path, and in so doing, the attack 
stream is effectively stopped while the good stream is protected from collateral dropping. 
Here we use the controlled flooding method to identify the attack links . In HTF, the 
filtering function is activated recursively from downstream routers to upstream routers 
hop-by-hop and the activation follows the sequence as controlled flooding. The 
synchronization of filterin g and controlled flooding can effectively decrease the reaction 
latency against DoS attacks because the filtering function can be activated by the 
identification of a single attack link instead of whole attack path. As the filtering function 
is activated in upstream routers that are close to the attacker, upstream link bandwidth 
consumed by attack packets can be greatly saved. In the rest of this section, we explain 
why controlled flooding is chosen as the traceback method in our mechanism, and then 
we introduce the functionality in routers and victims respectively.  
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3.2.1 Motivations to Select Controlled Flooding  
As we introduced in section 2.2.4, there are four different kinds of ways to trace back the 
original source(s) of an attack, which are logging, PPM, ICMP traceback and controlled 
flooding respectively. Although each traceback method can be used to provide us the 
attacking route information and help enhance filtering to some extent, in HTF, we only 
use controlled flooding as our traceback method. The reason lies in the hop-by-hop way 
that the controlled flooding method is carried out, which is consistent to our expectation 
of the HTF mechanism. We aim to propose a hybrid mechanism which is an integration 
of traceback and filtering mechanism and which can also react to DoS/DDoS attack with 
a low reaction delay and put a little burden on the routers meanwhile. Controlled flooding 
starts from the links  nearest to the victim and then recursively propagate up to the edges 
furthest from the victim a hop-by-hop. After each step of controlled flooding, a partial 
route of attack path (one edge) is identified which enables the scheme to propagate the 
filtering request to upstream routers recursively hop-by-hop. This feature enables us to 
create a tight connection between traceback mechanism and filtering mechanism filtering 
follows the step of traceback. Logging can also provide us the hop-by-hop feature as the 
victim can contact the upstream routers recursively and enable the filtering function 
simultaneously. However, the storage requirement for the routers in logging traceback is 
extremely high and we do not consider it currently. PPM and ICMP traceback can also 
enhance filtering and some works have been done in this field. As we introduced in 
section 3.1, [6] proposes a way to use PPM to improve output of legitimate traffic. 
However, the filtering function is totally non-integrated with the traceback function. Only 
after the traceback module completes its task, filtering function starts to work, which is 
not consistent to our idea of introducing a tightly-hybrid mechanism. In addition, it also 
brings a high reaction delay. In HTF, we evoke filtering function once a single link is 
identified as a bad one which enables the mechanism reacts to the DoS/DDoS attack 
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faster compared to the other mechanism using PPM or ICMP . In PPM or ICMP, the 
filtering function is idle until the full attack route is reconstructed. In addition, PPM and 
ICMP traceback put a great burden in the routers. The routers are responsible for pending 
partial path information in a packet on the fly or generating a new packet while in 
controlled flooding, the routers can be released from such works. However, we are not 
saying that using PPM or ICMP to enhance filter is not feasible; the reason we don not 
select them is based on our own concerns. In fact, using PPM or ICMP has its own 
advantages. PPM and ICMP will not introduce much extra traffic to traceback like 
controlled flooding does. Generally, how to use traceback method to enhance filtering is 
worthy research aspect and our future work may include investigating the feasibility of 
the combination between filtering and other traceback method (PPM or ICMP). 
In this paper, we use controlled flooding based on the consideration of low reaction delay, 
low consumption of routers and tightly-hybrid characterization. The use of PPM or ICMP 
is an alternative if the extra traffic produced by controlled flooding is not acceptable in 
some cases. We will discuss the damage brought by controlled flooding in simulation 
section and by studying the potential damage brought by controlled flooding in a special 
case, a wise decision on whether or not to use controlled flooding in terms of potential 
damage can be made. 
3.2.2 The Functionality of the Victim 
The main functionalit y of the victim includes controlled flooding functionality, attack link 
identification functionality, and filtering signal generation functionality. 
3.2.2.1 Controlled  Flooding  Functionality 
In our scheme, starting from the router most close to the victim, we apply a brief burst of 
29 
load to each link which is attached to the nearest router, and then recursively apply the 
link loading to all the upstream links. Three functions are required in the victim to 
conduct successful controlled flooding. Firstly, it requires that the victim be able to start 
the controlled flooding procedure correctly. The victim should be able to activate trace 
back as soon as the attack is detected. Secondly, it requires the victim find out voluntary 
cooperators in the Internet that can assist in flooding specific link effectively. To 
effectively load a link, the victim must resort to some assistance from the hosts or routers 
in the Internet, as the victim is unable to flood all the links effectively on its own ability. 
It must identify cooperative hosts that are willing to perform the task and are at the right 
place in the network map in order to produce the required load. The ideal routers are 
those that turn the chargen service on and are also on the far end of the tested link seen 
from the victim (Details refer to Chapter 2). Thirdly, the victim should be able to specify 
a link to test at each step. In selecting a tested link, the idea is that if a link is identified to 
be a good one then there is no need to test all the links behind it from the side of the 
victim. Otherwise, all the links behind it need to be tested in next steps. Lastly, once the 
attack is restrained into an acceptable range, the traceback should be stopped timely. If 
the attack has been effectively controlled by means of filtering, no upstream routers need 
to filter, thus no further  controlled flooding should be conducted. Otherwise, further 
controlled flooding should be done.  
3.2.2.2 Attack Link Identification Functionality  
This functionality requires the victim to observe the effect caused by controlled flooding. 
By observing changes in the attack streams, the attack link identification functionality can 
identify which links are bad. The assumption here is that if the loaded link is a component 
of the path of the attacking stream, the induced load will perturb the attacking stream. 
Therefore by observing the statistics of the attack stream before and after link loading, it 
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can deduce whether the tested-link is used by the attacker to send malicious packets. If 
the intensity of the stream is unperturbed by the load, it is unlikely to be the attack link. 
However, if the stream is altered when we load a link, then this link is likely to be on the 
path from the attacker to the victim.  
3.2.2.3 Filtering Signal Generation Functionality 
The function of filtering signal generation is to control filtering in different routers. It 
enables the victim to generate two different kinds of signaling packets. We define two 
new types of ICMP packets: ICMP filter-on and ICMP filter -off. The ICMP filter-on 
packet activates the filtering function in the destination router while the ICMP filter -off 
packet deactivates it. After a link is identified as being on the attack path, the victim 
generates an ICMP filter-off packet for the downstream router which was activated in the 
previous step and then generates an ICMP filter-on packet for the upstream router which 
is chosen to filter in the current step. An ICMP filter -on packet includes two items of 
information: the IP addresses of the routers at the ends of an attack link，and the Base 
Value (BV) as a tuning parameter based on which routers adjust their filtering probability. 
BV depends on the hop distance from the router to the victim. The direct upstream router 
of the victim is specified as level-1 node while routers with a two-hop distance from the 
victim are level-2 nodes, so on and so forth. Generally, a higher BV is assigned to a 
higher-level router, while a smaller BV is assigned to a lower-level router. Assume BV i   
refers o the base value of the level- i routers, and n is the highest level, then  
 
11 ++ D+= iii BVBV  with 10 << iBV and ),2,1(10 nii L=<D<    
 
As higher -level routers are closer to the attacker than lower-level routers, the precision in 
differentiating bad packets of high-level router is higher ; they should be assigned with 
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relatively higher BVs. On the contrary, lower-level router should be assigned with 
relatively lower BV to minimize the probability of dropping good packets.  
3.2.3 Functionality of the Routers 
The main functionalitie s of the routers include Decision Making Functionality and Packet 
Dropping Functionality. 
3.2.3.1 Decision Making Functionality 
The decision making functionality enables the victim to decide the type of packets that 
should be dropped and in what percentage. Generally, it performs two tasks. The first task 
is to classify the packets passing through the router. Consider that the router knows the 
attack edge. We represent the destination address of a packet and the incoming link of the 
packet as dest and link  respectively. The address of the victim is denoted by Avic, and 
the combination of all the attack links is denoted by Latt. The various parameters are 
illustrated in the following table. 
 
Table 3.1 Parameters used in Decision Making Functionality 
Parameters  Meaning of the parameters 
dest  the destination address of a packet 
link the incoming link of a packet 
Avic The address of the victim  
Latt the combination of all the attack links 
 
 In our scheme, we classify the packets into four categories.  
 
Type A:  vicatt AdestLlink =Î &   
Type B:  vicatt AdestLlink ¹Î &  
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Type C:  vicatt AdestLlink =Ï &  
Type D:  vicatt AdestLlink ¹Ï &  
 
Corresponding to the four types of packets, we calculate four different probability values. 
 
Pa: probability of passing packets of type A 
Pb: probability of passing packets of type B 
Pc: probability of passing packets of type C 
Pd: probability of passing packets of type D 
 
The values of the four probability parameters are determined by the following: 
1. We define four global probability parameters: Pa’, P b’, Pc’ and Pd’. We assume that all 
the routers in our mechanism have the same set of values of these parameters and that the 
values are all in the range of 0 to 1.0.  
2. According to the conditional probability of certain types of packets to be attack 
packets, we can set different values of the four parameters: Pa’, Pb’, Pc’ and Pd’ 
respectively. Clearly, type A packets are most likely to be attack packets, therefore, the 
value for Pa’ should be highest. Similarly, type D packets are most likely to be good 
packets, hence the value of Pd’ should be the smallest. And the values of Pb’ and Pc’ 
should be set between P a’ and P d’.  
3. Initially, Pa’ is set to a large percentage value (1.0 in the simulation) to effectively 
stop type A streams. Pb’ and Pd’ are set to a very small value (0.0 in the simulation) to 
pass type B or D packets as most as those packets are not destined to the victim. Pc’ can 
also be set to a small value (0.0 in the simulation) as these packets are identified as 
legitimate ones in our scheme. However, as the precision in identifying an attack link 
cannot be guaranteed which may be affected by many factor, we should increase the 
value for Pc’ slightly.  
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4. All the values should be decided based on the base value passed by the victim. 
Suppose that the base value set for a router is BV, then all the probabilities for this router 
to drop packets are calculated as: 
 
'aa PBVP ´=  
'bb PBVP ´=  
'PcBVPc ´=  
'PdBVPd ´=  
3.2.3.2 Packet Filtering Functionality 
Based on the information generated from the filtering decision functionality, the 
preferential packet filtering is carried out. Figure 3.1 presents a pseudo code of the 
filtering algorithm.  
3.3 Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our hybrid mechanism under a DoS attack 
using the ns2 simulation software. First we explain the common configuration settings of 
routers and hosts in our simulation, and the attack model used in our simulation. Then we 
present some performance metrics used in the simulation. Finally, we present the results 
of our simulation.  
For each incoming packet 
  If attLlink Î  
     If vicAdest =  
             Pass the packet with probability Pa 
     Else  
             Pass the packet with probability Pb 
Else   If vicAdest =   
             Pass the packet with probability Pc 
          Else  
             Pass the packet with probability Pd 
Figure 3.1 Packet Filtering Functionality 
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3.3.1 Common Configuration 
For our simulation, we use a binary tree topology construction as our network model. In 
this topology, there are 256 hosts, 255 routers and 1 victim as shown in Figure 3.2. We 
















host1 host2 ... ... ... ... host255 host256
... ... ... ...
 
Figure 3.2 Network Topology in NS-2 Simulation 
 
The basic configuration parameters of all the legitimate hosts are the same. They are 
assumed to have the same packet generation rate in each run and the same maxim um 
packet size. Specifically, to create a successful attack that can generate congestion 
effectively, we set the packet generation rate of the attacker to a much larger value than 
the legitimate ones. In section 3.3 we show the effect of different packet generation rates 
on the performance metrics which are introduced in section 3.3.2. In our mechanism the 
routers execute the same tasks, and we set the same queue length. In this simulation, we 
have 511 links with the same link bandwidth and link delay. Detailed configuration 
values are given in Table 3.2. 
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3.3.2 Performance Metrics 
To evaluate the performance of our mechanism, some performance metrics are introduced.  
Firstly, to show the advantage in improving the throughput of legitimate packets, we 
introduce tw o metrics: the Good Packets Percentage (GPP) and the Bad Packets 
Percentage (BPP), w hich are the percentage of good and bad packets respectively. These 
two metrics are measured at the victim and we have 
Table 3.2 Common Configuration Values 
Bad Packets Generation Rate Rb 50,100,200,500,1000 
packets/second 
Good Packets Generation Rate Rg 1 packet/second 
Maximum Packet Size Spkt 500 bytes 
Maximum Length of Packet Queue 
in routers 
Lqueue 64  
Maximum Delay time of a router Tdelay 30ms 
Link Bandwidth Blink 1Gb/s 
Link Delay Tlink 100ms 
Base value to 1-hop away router  BV1 0.3 
Increment  ?  0.1 
 
 
BPP+GPP=1 by definition. As our mechanism strives to release dropping legitimate 
packets, we evaluate our mechanism on the effectiveness of dropping bad packets and 
protecting good ones. We define Good Packets Dropping Percentage (GPDP), which is 
actually the False Positive Ratio, and Bad Packets Dropping Percentage (BPDP). In HTF, 
we recursively propagate the filtering request to upstream routers to save the bandwidth 
consumption of upstream links, so w e also evaluate the performance of bandwidth 
consumption theoretically. In the rest of the section we present our results for each metric 
respectively.  
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3.3.3 Simulation Results and Analysis  
 




    Hop Number 
Figure 3.4 Good Packet Drop Percentage (False Positive Ratio) in DoS cases  
 
 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show the BPDP and the GPDP as a function of the hop number 
respectively. As we can see from Figures 3.3 and 3.4, BPDP and GPDP at a given hop are 
almost the same when the attackers generate bad packets at different rates. For instance, 
when the first- level routers filter, the BPDPs and GPDPs are about 30% and 15% 
respectively (Detailed values are shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). That is because 
routers drop packets with the same probability despite the packets generation rate. As 
shown in Figure 3.3, when the hop number increases, BPDP increases. For instance, 
BPDP is about 30% when first- level routers filter , and then gradually increases to 100% 
when last hop is reached. That is consistent with the dropping probability used in our 
simulation which ranges from 0.3 to 1. Similarly, as we can see from Figure 3.4, while 
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hop number increases, GPDP decreases instead. For instance, when first-level routers 
filter, GPDP is about 15%; at the last hop, the value decreases to about 0%. The reason 
for GPDPs decreasing with increasing dropping probability of a router is that higher 
precision for higher-level routers helps identify bad packets which makes up for collateral 
damage. Higher-level routers are more accurate in differentiating good packets from bad 
packets by their incoming links as the bad and good streams are not highly integrated at 
this point. Even though the higher-level routers drop packets heavily, good packets are 
discarded less.  
 
Figure 3.5 Good Packets Percentage (GPP) in DoS cases 
 
            
Table 3.3 Bad Packet Drop Percentage (BPDP) in DoS cases 
Ratio Nhop=1 Nhop=2 Nhop=3 Nhop=4 Nhop=5 Nhop=6 Nhop=7 Nhop=8 
50:1 30.20 39.48 50.50 60.03 69.29 79.67 90.16 100.00 
100:1 29.11 40.59 50.57 60.01 70.05 79.64 90.14 100.00 
200:1 29.67 40.04 9.57 59.42 69.72 79.78 89.99 100.00 
500:1 30.11 39.46 49.50 59.56 9.85 80.21 89.91 100.00 
1000:1 30.04 39.62 49.97 59.81 70.25 79.76 90.02 100.00 
 
 
Table 3.4 Good Packet Drop Percentage (GPDP) in DoS cases 
Ratio Nhop=1 Nhop=2 Nhop=3 Nhop=4 Nhop=5 Nhop=6 Nhop=7 Nhop=8 
50:1 15.07 10.04 5.57 3.47 2.52 1.33 0.11 0.0039 
100:1 15.31 9.99 5.82 3.13 2.62 0.95 0.23 0.0078 
200:1 14.15 9.77 6.40 3.45 2.79 1.52 0.59 0.0039 
500:1 15.32 10.16 6.39 3.76 2.24 0.97 0.82 0.0270 
1000:1 15.22 8.73 4.51 4.23 3.06 2.04 0.84 0.0039 
 
 
Table 3.5 Good Packets Percentage (GPP) in DoS cases 
Ratio Nhop=0 Nhop=1 Nhop=2 Nhop=3 Nhop=4 Nhop=5 Nhop=6 Nhop=7 Nhop=8 
50:1 83.67 86.12 88.35 90.68 92.49 4.18 96.12 98.11 100.00 
100:1 71.87 5.29 79.44 82.93 86.07 89.24 92.54 96.27 100.00 
200:1 56.25 60.88 65.74 70.30 75.21 80.361 86.13 92.68 100.00 
500:1 33.87 38.19 43.08 48.57 54.83 62.32 71.85 83.37 100.00 
1000:1 20.92 23.61 27.82 32.73 7.80 45.38 55.24 71.71 100.00 
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Figure 3.5 shows GPP as a function of the hop number. The five curves in the figure 
correspond to 50:1, 100:1, 200:1, 500:1 and 1000:1 respectively,  which are the ratio of 
the rate that bad packets are generated over the rate that good packets are generated. As 
shown in Figure 3.5, when the hop number increases, GPP increases gradually (Detailed 
values are shown in Table 3.5). For instance, when the ratio is 1000:1, GPP increases 
from 21% to 100%, which represents an improvement of 378%. The higher GPP reflects 
the increasing effectiveness of HTF. Particularly, when the highest-level routers drop all 

























Figure 3.6 Simulation Time 
 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the time consumption in the simulation of the HTF-DoS mechanism as 
a function of the hop number. As we can see from the above figure, there are five curves 
which correspond to 50:1, 100:1, 200:1, 500:1 and 1000:1 respectively. Each ratio 
represents the ratio of the rate that bad packets are generated over the rate that good 
packets are generated, which is the same as that in figure 3.5.  
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As shown in Figure 3.6, when the hop number increases, time increases gradually due to 
the progress of the simulation. In addition, the curve corresponding to a smaller ratio 
value is always above the one corresponding to a greater ratio value during the whole 
simulation progress. The curve corresponding to 50:1 is the highest curve and the curve 
corresponding to 1000:1 is the lowest one among the five curves in Figure 3.6. This is due 
to the method we use to simulate the functionality of the victim, specifically, the Attack 
Link Identification Functionality. As we introduced in section 3.2.2, the attack link 
identification functionality of the victim is to identify the bad links by observing changes 
in the attack streams. For simplicity, in this simulation, we identify the bad links by 
counting the percentage of the number of the bad packets over the number of all packets. 
The change of the percentage of the bad packets is a sign of perturbation of the bad 
streams, and also a sign of bad link identification consequent ly. To identify the bad links 
more precisely, we count the percentage of the number of the bad packets only when the 
number of all the packets reaches  a certain threshold instead of counting it at a random 
time point. According to the rational of the probability theory and mathematical statistics, 
the result is more accurate when the sample space is bigger. By setting a threshold when 
we need to count the bad packets percentage, we can guarantee the sample space is large 
enough to produce an accurate enough result. That is to say, a proper setting of threshold 
value for the total number of the packets can guarantee the bad packets percentage 
represents the change of an attacking stream accurately. We use the same counting 
threshold whatever the rate that bad packets are generated, which results in the different 
process time of the HTF-DoS mechanism with different bad packets generation rate. 
When the rate of bad packets generation is higher, it is faster to meet the requirement of 
counting threshold and the decision can be made in a shorter time, which results in a 
shorter process time. On the contrary, when the attacker generates the bad packets in a 
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lower rate, the process time is increased. That is why the curve corresponding to a smaller 
ratio value is always above the one corresponding to a higher ratio value. 
 
From figure 3.6, we can see that when the ratio is 1000:1, our mechanism processes to the 
first- level routers when the simulation time is around 21 and processes to the last level 
when the simulation time is around 778. As we said in section 2.2.4, link testing itself is a 
kind of DoS attacks. It brings temporarily congestion to the internet links when it is 
carried on, which results in serious packets lost or even link inaccessibility. That is to say, 
during the period of 778 simulation time, there are always some links suffering from link 
testing. And the period lasts even longer when the bad packets generation rate is lower. 
The potential damage brought by link testing is the main downside of our mechanism . 
However, it doesn’t deny the feasibility of the HTF-DoS mechanism. The reason is as 
follows, from the figure 3.6 we can see that the HTF-DoS mechanism takes effect at 
simulation time 21, which shows that our mechanism can react to a DoS attack timely. On 
simulation time 21, the DoS attack is under control already. During the period from time 
21 to time 778, there are some links suffering from link testing; however there are still 
some links released from DoS attack by the filtering functionality at routers. The damage 
brought by the link testing, while at the same time and the benefits some links can get 
from the link testing interact together during the whole process time. Therefore, we can 
not take the period of 708 simulation time as a totally disaster time. Moreover, we can 
understand that after the whole process completes all the effect that the HTF-DoS 
mechanism brings is in the bright side. As the damage brought by link testing is always a 
big concern,  we have some suggestions in implementing the HTF-DoS mechanism. If the 
current DoS attack tends to last a long time, say, much longer than 778s, we can 
definitely use the HTF-DoS mechanism, as the link testing time is neglectable compared 
to the whole attack period. In a long run, it is worthwhile to temporarily congest some 
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suspicious links in order to release the network from the attack which may last for a long 
period of time. When it is not sure of the period that a DoS attack may last, or it tends to 
last shorter than 778s, the decision is not that straight forward and we need to consider it 
carefully. However, the benefits that the HTF-DoS mechanism brings and unique 
characters that the HTF-DoS mechanism has still qualify the implementation of the HTF-
DoS for our consideration. Especially, when there is a requirement of short reaction delay 
and few burdens on the routers, and even when other mechanisms are not applicably at 
current time, the use of the HTF-DoS mechanism is still a good choice. Moreover, 
regarding the process time, we need to mention that it represents only the simulation time, 
which may be further reduced in real implementation. In this simulation, we use a very 
dump method to imitate the link identification functionality, which costs a lot of 
unnecessary time to wait the total number of the packets exceeding the threshold. In 
realistic implementation, we can use the real monitoring tools  which can detect the 
change of the bad stream timely, and in so doing, we can save the process time greatly. 
The bad link identification functionality is the key functionality of the HTF-DoS 
mechanism, which is called in each step. If we can reduce the process time of bad link 
identification functionality even slightly by introduction of real monitoring tools, the 
whole process time is expected to be reduced greatly and the potential damage brought by 
link testing can be reduced consequently.       
 
3.3.4 Theoretical Analysis 
Our mechanism also saves upstream bandwidth consumption compared to those schemes 
where only the low level routers filter. We assume the router i hops away from the victim 
drops the type A packets with the probability Pai, drops B,  C and D types of packets with 
zero probability respectively. Suppose the bad packet generation rate is Rb and the good 
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packet generation rate is Rg. In an i-level binary tree topology where the number of 
attackers is Na and the number of non-attackers is Nn, the upstream link consumption C 
in our mechanism is as follows: 
C = (Na•Rb + Nn•Rg) + (Na•Rb•(1-PaI-1) + Nn•Rg)•(I-1) 
Before arriving at the highest- level routers, all streams (good and bad) traverse without 
packet being dropped. Therefore the bandwidth consumption at highest- level link is (Na • 
Rb + Nn • Rg). After passing through the highest level, PaI-1  of bad packets are 
dropped. So the bandwidth consumption of each following level is Na • Rb• (1-PaI-1) + 
Nn • Rg. Altogether, the total link bandwidth consumption caused by HTF is given in 
above formula.  
 
Let’s consider the case that only the router one-hop away from the victim filters and 
drops all A type of packets with probability P of 1, then the upstream link consumption 
C’ is as the following: 
C’ = (Na•Rb + Nn•Rg)•(I-1) + (Na•Rb•(1-P) + Nn•Rg) 
 
Because no packet is dropped until reaching the level-1 routers, the total bandwidth 
consumption from level-I to level-1 is  (Na • Rb + Nn • Rg) • (I-1). After passing 
through level-1 routers, P of bad packets are dropped, so the bandwidth consumption of 
the link between victim and level-1 routers is Na • Rb• (1-P) + Nn • Rg.  
 
The values of C and C’ according to different values of Rb are shown in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6 Values of C and C’ 
 Rb=50 Rb=100 Rb=200 Rb=500 Rb=1000 
Consumption 2345 2395 2495 2795 3295 




As we can see from Table 3.6, the upstream bandwidth consumption is greatly saved in 
our mechanism by 12.99%, 22.62%, 35.94%, 55.60% and 67.99% when Rb is 50, 100, 
200, 500 and 1000 respectively. And the higher rate for the attacker to generate bad 
packets, larger percentage of link bandwidth is saved. Hence we can say our scheme 
works even better when the attacker is stronger on the metric of bandwidth consumption.  
3.3.5 Feasibility in Real Network  
In this simulation, we use a binary-tree topology as our network construction. When we 
implement the HTF-DoS mechanism in real network, we need no changes in the design of 
HTF-DoS itself. The illustration is as follows. 
 
 Figure 3.7 Random Network Topology in DoS Cases 
 
In a random network topology as shown in figure 3.7, there is one attacker A and some 
good hosts marked as G. The route that the attacking traffic takes is marked red while the 
routes that are not affected by the attacking traffic are marked black.  When implementing 
the HTF-DoS mechanism in a random network topology, for instance figure 3.7, we need 
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not change any functionality in the routers or the victim. Specially, as for the filtering 
signal generation functionally of the victim, victim is responsible to generate two kinds of 
different signaling packets to control filtering and link testing in different routers. Once a 
link is identified as a bad one in a certain level, the according ICMP packets are sent out 
by the victim immediately. The victim will not test other links in the same level anymore 
and propagate the mechanism to upstream levels directly. Whatever how many links are 
connected to a router (in a random graph, the number of the links connecting to a router is 
uncertain), the method works well which will not let any suspicious links untested. The 
reason lays in a DoS attack the attack traffic has only one source and comes from only 
one direction. Once an attack link is identified, there is no possibility of other attack links 
existing besides this one.  Hence whatever the topology is, ultimately, we can traceback 
the attacking source A and evoke filtering module in router R8. The red lines in figure 3.7 
show the way that filtering function is evoked consequently. 
 
Figure 3.8 Random Network Topology in DoS cases  (good links omitted) 
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3.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we proposed a hybrid traceback-filtering (HTF) mechanism that leverages 
on the controlled flooding method to identify the attack links. Then by preferentially 
dropping packets coming from attack links in the routers that are on the attack path, HTF 
effectively mitigates the attack while protecting the legitimate traffic from collateral 
damage. In the HTF mechanism, the packet filtering function at the routers is recursively 
activated hop-by-hop to progressively save the bandwidth consumption in upstream links. 
We performed simulations using ns2 to evaluate the performance of our HTF mechanism 
under DoS attack. Simulation results show that our mechanism is able to drop 30% of bad 
packets at the start of the process and up to 100% when the traceback is completed.  Our 
simulation also shows that the false positive ratio ranges from 15% to 0% at the 
beginning and end of the traceback-filtering process respectively. As a result, our 
mechanism can improve the throughput of legitimate packets. Theoretical analysis shows 
that our mechanism can save link bandwidth consumption. For instances, when the 
generation rate of bad packets is 500 times that of the good packets, the link bandwidth 






DDoS attacks aim to deny legitimate users from their access to some services as well as 
DoS attacks do. However, the scale of a DDoS attack is much larger than a DoS attack. In 
a DoS attack, only one attacker is involved in while in a DDoS attack, numerous hosts are 
coordinated by the real attacker to carry out an attack. Thanks to its distributed 
characteristic , DDoS attacks multiply the effectiveness of an attack. Also, DDoS attacks 
are harder to be traced as DDoS attacks enable a diversity of sources . All of these 
accelerate DDoS attacks substitute DoS attacks to be the main trend in DoS attacker 
community. And it is necessary for us to extend the HTF mechanism to DDoS cases.  
To extend the HTF mechanism to DDoS cases, we entitle the victim with more 
responsibility. Accordingly, the three functionality of the victim (controlled flooding 
functionality, attack identification functionality and filtering signal generation 
functionality) become more complicated. We will introduce them respectively in section 
4.2 and 4.3. Meanwhile, as we keep the functionality of the routers unchanged, we will 
not repeat them in this chapter (please refer to chapter 2 for the details of the functionality 
in the routers).  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 briefly introduces the improvement of 
the functionality of the victim in the HTF-DDoS mechanism. Section 4.2 introduces  the 
functionality of the victim respectively. In section 4.3 both performance evaluations 
47 
through extensive simulations in ns-2 and theoretically analysis are described. Finally in 
section 4.4 we summarize the results and conclude this chapter. 
4.1 A Brief Introduction of the Functionality of the Victim 
l Controlled Flooding Functionality. The controlled flooding functionality requires 
the victim to have three basic abilities which are similar to those in the HTF-DoS 
mechanism. However, some difference exists. Firstly, in the HTF-DoS mechanism, the 
termination of the whole process depends on the how the attack stream is restrained. Only 
when the attack stream is restrained into an acceptable range, the HTF-DoS mechanism is 
stopped. However, in the HTF-DDoS mechanism, the termination is also determined by a 
new tuning parameter T which affects the highest level of the Internet that the HTF-DDoS 
mechanism can reach. Details of the tuning parameter T is given in the section 4.2. 
Secondly,  a bad link marking algorithm is added to the HTF-DDoS mechanism which 
helps to specify a link to test in each step.                                                                                                                                                                                                              
l Attack Link Identification Functionality. The attack link identification 
functionality means the ability for a victim to identify attack links from good ones. The 
difference between the HTF-DoS mechanism and the HTF-DDoS mechanism lies on the 
introduction of a tuning parameter T which adjusts the sensitivity of the victim in 
identifying the bad links. 
l Filtering Signal Generation Functionality. The filtering s ignal generation 
functionality is the ability for a victim to control the filtering function and link testing 
function in routers. Different from the HTF-DoS mechanism, four kinds of signal packets 
are added to the HTF-DDoS mechanism which is ICMP filter-on, ICMP filter-off, ICMP 
linktesting-on and ICMP linktesting-off. 
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4.2 The Functionality of the Victim 
The main functionality of victim includes controlled flooding functionality, attack link 
identification functionality and filtering signal generation functionality. 
l Controlled Flooding Functionality. Similar to the HTF-DoS mechanism, in the 
HTF-DDoS mechanism, starting from router closet to the victim, we apply a brief burst of 
load to each link which is attached to the nearest router, and then recursively apply the 
link loading to all the upstream links. Three functions are required in the victim to 
conduct successful controlled flooding. Firstly, it requires that the victim be able to start 
the controlled flooding procedure correctly which is the same to the HTF-DoS 
mechanism. Secondly, it requires the victim find out voluntary cooperators in the Internet 
that can assist in flooding specific link effectively which is mostly similar to the HTF-
DoS mechanism except that in DDoS attacks, much more voluntary cooperators are 
needed. It is not easy to get so many cooperators in reality, however, for the sake of 
research, we assume that the victim  can always get the cooperate hosts on its needs. 
Thirdly, the victim should be able to specify a link to test in each step which is similar to 
that in the HTF-DoS mechanism. Additionally, we propose a bad link marking algorithm 
(illustrated in the following figure) which identifies the unsuspicious links from the 
suspicious ones and marks them respectively.   
In the marking algorithm, we assume the maximum identification value of all the links in 
the Internet is M, the highest level of the Internet is H and the union of all the 
unsuspicious links is U. Suppose the identification number of a link is id, the level of a 
link in the Internet is Lid, and the near end of the link is N id and the far end of the link is 
Fid. All the parameters are listed in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 illustrates the marking 
algorithm briefly.     
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Table 4.1 Parameters in Marking Algorithm 
Parameters Meaning of the parameters 
M the maximum identification value of all the links on 
the Internet 
H the highest level of the Internet 
U  the union of all unsuspicious links 
id the identification number of a link 
Lid the level of a link 
N id the near end of a link 
F id the far end of a link 
 
In the DDoS-HTF mechanism, we adopt a Breadth-First Traversal algorithm [41] for link 
searching. The process of selecting a suspicious link to be tested in each step is actually a 
tree traversal process. By using the breadth-first traversal algorithm, we prefer to choose 
the links which are in the same level as the previously tested link I, unless all the 
suspicious links in this level are already tested, we select the link to be tested next from 
the suspicious links in the upstream levels.  
Lastly, the victim should stop the whole process timely. There are two cases: firstly, when 
the attack is restrained into an acceptable range which is the same as that in the HTF-DoS 
mechanism. Secondly, the victim terminates the process when the HTF-DDoS mechanism 
cannot be propagated up any more, which is a great difference compared to DoS cases. A 
tuning parameter T is introduced to the HTF-DDoS mechanism which affects the highest 
level that the HTF-DDoS mechanism can reach in the Internet, therefore the HTF-DDoS 
mechanism may become ineffective before the real attacker is traced or the attack stream 
is constrained into an acceptable range. Besides the two cases, further controlled flooding 
should be done.  
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Figure 4.1 Marking Algorithm 
 
l Attack Link Identification Functionality.  This functionality requires the victim  
to observe the effect caused by controlled flooding. By observing changes in the attack 
streams, the victim tells which links are bad ones. However, there is no quantitative 
specification on how much change could be a sign of bad stream perturbing so far. Hence 
we introduce a tuning parameter T to solve this problem. We state that on ly if the 
intensity of the attack stream after link testing is less than the value of T out of the 
intensity before link testing, the link under test is identified as an attack one. Otherwise, 
the link under test is identified as a good one. In one word, the victim takes the links 
which contribute more than 1/T of the whole attack traffic as bad links.  
The introduction of the tuning parameter T brings two particulars to the HTF-DDoS 
mechanism. Firstly, the value of the tuning parameter T decides the sensitivity of the 
victim in attack link identification. Specifically, a higher value of the tuning parameter T 
enables a higher sensitivity while a smaller value of the tuning parameter T brings a lower 
sensitivity. When T is given a high value, according to the definition of the tuning 
parameter  T, the victim can detect links contributing more that 1/T percent of the attack 
traffic and which is a small value accordingly. That means the victim can identify the 
attack links sensitively. On the contrary, when T is given a low value, the sensitivity of 
the victim is low. 
For each link id in the Internet 
If link id is a good one  
   Put id into U 
While (id < M&& Lid<H)  
For each link id’ in level Lid+1 
           If Nid’ = Fid 




Secondly, the value of the tuning parameter T indirectly affects the highest level that the 
HTF-DDoS mechanism can reach in Internet. The reason is as follows: the attack stream 
is gradually integrated while flowing to the victim, and seen from the victim, a higher-
level attack link contribute a smaller portion to the whole attack stream. Therefore, when 
T is given a smaller value, the victim is less sensitive in the attack traffic change and it is 
less possible to identify the higher-level bad links. Inversely, when we have a higher 
value of the tuning parameter T, the victim is more capable to detect the higher -level bad 
links and the HTF-DDoS mechanism can be propagated up to a higher-level of the 
Internet. We prove the two statements by simulations which are given in Section 4.3. 
l Filtering Signal Generation Functionality. The function of filtering signal 
generation is to control filtering and link testing in different routers. In the HTF-DoS 
mechanism, the correspondent functionality introduces two kinds of signaling packets: 
ICMP filter-on and ICMP filter-off. In the HTF-DoS mechanism, the victim generates 
two more kinds of signaling packets: ICMP linktesting-on and ICMP linktesting-off, at 
the same time we also improve the function of ICMP filter -on and ICMP filter -off.  
The ICMP filter-on packet activates the filtering function in the destination router while 
the ICMP filter -off packet deactivates it. Different from the ICMP filter-off in the HTF-
DoS mechanism which turns off the filter ing function entirely, the ICMP filter -off 
packets in the HTF-DDoS mechanism turns off it partially. It only deactivates the router 
in dropping packets from specific links. In the HTF-DoS mechanism, on the receipt of 
ICMP filter-off, the router passes all the packets through whatever their incoming links. 
However, in the HTF-DDoS mechanism, the routers only lets those from the link 
specified in the ICMP filter-off packet go and keeps dropping the rest. The ICMP 
linktesting-on packet activates the link testing function in the destination router  while the 
ICMP linktesting-off packet deactivates it.  
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After a link R1-R2 (R1 and R2 are the end routers of R1-R2 link) is identified as being on 
the attack path, the victim generates an ICMP filter-on packet for the nearer end of R1-R2 
link seen from the victim, say R2. If the R1-R2 link is a right branch in Internet, the 
victim also generates an ICMP filter-off packet for the father node of R2 which is R3. 
The ICMP filter-off packet stops R3 router from dropping packets coming from R2-R3. If 
the attack link is identified as not being on the attack path, two cases come up. If the R1-
R2 is a right branch, the victim generates an ICMP linktesting-off packet for the R2 and 
generates an ICMP filter -on packet to R3. Otherwise the victim generates an ICMP 
linktesting-on packet to the R2 and the right sibling branch of R1-R2 is to be tested next. 
An ICMP filter-on packet includes two items of information: the IP addresses of the 
routers at the ends of an attack link, and the Base Value (BV) as a tuning parameter based 
on which routers adjust their filtering probability which is the same to that in the HTF-
DoS mechanism.  
An ICMP filter-off packet tells the destination which incoming link should not be rate 
limited by then. Hence an ICMP filter -off packet includes the IP addresses of the end 
routers of this link.  
An ICMP linktesting-on packet includes the IP addresses of the end routers of the link 
which is chosen to test next and an ICMP linktesting-off packet includes the IP addresses 
of the end routers of the link which is currently tested. 
Suppose the near end router of a link Rn-Rf is Rn and the far end is Rf. Then the 
algorithm is as the following: 
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Figure 4.2 Filtering Signal Generation 
 
4.3 Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the HTF-DDoS mechanism under DDoS 
attack using the ns2 simulation software. First we explain the common configuration 
settings and attack model used in our simulation. Then we present the results of our 
simulation by some performance metrics which is the same as that in the HTF-DoS 
mechanism. 
4.3.1 Common Configuration 
In the HTF-DDoS simulation, we use the same network model as the one used in HTF- 
DoS simulation. We simulate a larger-scale attack by increasing the number of the 
attackers which are selected from 256 hosts randomly and are also location-integrated. 
The rest hosts are assumed to be legitimate ones. The basic configuration parameters of 
all the legitimate hosts, attacks, routers and links are the same as that used in DoS 
simulations.  
For the link tested in the current step 
If the link is a bad one 
     If the link is a right one 
        Send an ICMP filter-on packet for Rn aimed at Rf 
Send an ICMP filter-off packet for Rn/2 aimed at Rn 
 Else  
 Send an ICMP filter-on packet for Rn aimed at Rf 
Else if the link is a right one 
     Send an ICMP linktesting-off packet for Rn aimed at Rf 
Send an ICMP filter-off packet for Rn/2 aimed at Rn 
     Else  
     Send an ICMP filter-on packet for Rn aimed at Rf+1 
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4.3.2 Performance Metrics 
To evaluate the performance of the HTF-DDoS mechanism, we use the same 
performance metrics introduced in Chapter 3: the Good Packets Percentage (GPP), the 
Bad Packets Percentage (BPP), the Good Packets Dropping Percentage (GPDP) and the 
Bad Packets Dropping Percentage (BPDP). We also evaluate the performance of 
bandwidth consumption theoretically. In the rest of the section we present our results for 
each metric respectively.  
















































































































































































































Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.6 show the GPP as a function of the hop number respectively. The 
eight curves in each figure above reflect the different scale of DDoS attacks and 
correspond to one-attacker case, five-attacker case and ten-attacker case etc respectively. 
As shown in each figure, when the hop number increases, GPP increases gradually. For 
instance, as we can see from Figure 4.5, when the number of the attackers is 10 and the 
value of the tuning parameter is 0.95, GPP increases from 20% to 100%, which represents 
an improvement of 400%. The higher GPP reflects the higher effectiveness of HTF. In 
addition, we can see from each figure that when the number of the attackers increases, the 
highest-level that HTF-DDoS can reach increases. For instance, in figure 4.5 when there 
are less than 15 attackers, the HTF-DDoS mechanism can be propagated up to the top 
level of the internet topology, while when the number of attackers is between 20 and 40, 
the HTF-DDoS mechanism can only reach the second-top level of the internet topology. 
The observation is consistent to the value of T used in the simulation. In figure 4.5, the 
value of the tuning parameter T is 0.95 which means we can only detect the attack links 
which contribute at least twenty percent of the whole attack volume and those 
contributing less than twenty percent of the whole attack volume are neglected.  When 
the number of the attackers is less than 15, all the top-level links being on the way of the 
attack stream contribute at least 15 percent of the attack stream; therefore, each of them 
can be detected by the HTF-DDoS mechanism. While when the number of the attackers is 
between 20 and 40, all the top-level bad links contribute less than the 20 percent of the 
whole attack volume, and the HTF-DDoS process can not reach the highest level. 
However, the process can be propagated up to the second-top level of the internet 
topology as each second-level attack links contribute more than twenty percent of the 
whole attack volume.    
57 
From the four figures-Figures 4.3 to Figure 4.6, we can see that when the attack scale is 
fixed, the HTF-DDoS mechanism is more effective when the value of T is higher. When 
the value of T increases from 0.85 to 0.95, the HTF-DDoS process can be propagated up 
to a higher and higher level. For instance, when the value is 0.85, we can implement the 
HTF-DDoS mechanism to the whole internet only when the number of the attackers 
ranges from 1 to 5, however, when the value of the tuning parameter is 0.98, the HTF-
DDoS mechanism can reach top level of internet topology when number of attacker 
ranges from 1 to 20. In addition, when the number of the attackers is 30, the highest level 
that the HTF-DDoS mechanism can be propagated up to is fourth-top level, third-top 
level, second-top level and top-level when the value of T is 0.85, 0.9, 0.95 and 0.98 
respectively. It can be explained by the mechanism itself. The bigger value of the tuning 
parameter  T enables the HTF-DDoS mechanism to detect those less-contribution links 
which may not be detected given a smaller T value, as a result, the highest level can be 
reached increases. 
Suppose the value of T is Vt and there are Ni links passed by the attack packets in ith-
level of the internet topology. When the top level of internet topology is I, we can use the 


















































































































































































































































































Figure 4.14 GPDP with T equal to 0.98 
 
 
Figure 4.5 to Figure 4.12 show the BPDP and the GPDP as a function of the hop number 
respectively. As we can see from the above figures, whatever the value of the tuning 
parameter T is, BPDP and GPDP at a given hop are almost the same despite the number 
of attackers varies. For instance, w hen the first- level routers filter, the BPDPs and GPDPs 
are all about 30% and 15% respectively. That is because that the routers drop the bad 
packets with the same probability despite the number of attackers. In addition, we can see 
from Figure 4.5 to Figure 4.8 that when the hop number increases, BPDP increases. For 
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instance, BPDP is about 30% when first-level routers filter, and then gradually increases 
to 100% at the last hop. That is consistent to the dropping probability used in our 
simulations which ranges from 0.3 to 1. In addition, as we can see from Figure 4.9 to 
Figure 4.12, while the hop number  increases, GPDP decreases instead. For instance, w hen 
the first-level routers filter, GPDP is about 15%; at the last step, the value decreases to 
about 0%. The reason for GPDPs decreasing with increasing dropping probability of a 
router is that the higher precision for a higher-level router to identify bad packets makes 
up the collateral damage greatly. Higher-level routers are more accurate in differentiating 
good packets from  bad packets by their incoming links as the bad and good streams are 
not highly integrated. Even though the higher-level routers drop packets heavily, good 
packets are discarded less. Due to the imperfect precision of the simulation, the 
decreasing trend of GPDP is  not absolute and it may be disturbed in a few steps, however, 





































































































































































Figure 4.20 GPDP with fifty attackers 
 
 
Figure 4.15 to 4.20 show the BPDP and the GPDP as a function of the hop number 
respectively. As we can see from the above figures, the BPDPs and GPDPs do not change 
with the value of T, nevertheless the highest level can be reached by the HTF-DDoS 
process changes. For instance, in figure 4.16 and figure 4.17 when the first- level routers 
filter, the BPDPs and GPDPs are all about 30% and 15% whatever the value of the tuning 
parameter  T is 0.85 or 0.9 or 0.95 and 0.98. That is because routers drop packets with the 
same probability despite of the value of T. However, the highest level that the HTF-DDoS 
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mechanism changes when the value of T, which is theoretically analyzed in section 4.2 
and we don not repeat again.  
4.3.4 Theoretical Analysis 
Our mechanism also saves upstream bandwidth consumption compared to those schemes 
where only the low level routers filter. We assume the router i hops away from the victim 
drops type A packets with the probability Pai, drops types B,C and D packets with zero 
probability respectively. Suppose the bad packet generation rate is Rb and the good 
packets generation rate is Rg. In an i- level binary tree topology where the number of 
attackers is Na and the number of non-attackers is Nn, the upstream link consumption C 
in our mechanism is as follows: 
C = (Na•Rb + Nn•Rg) + (Na•Rb•(1-PaI-1) + Nn•Rg) • (I-1) 
 
Let’s consider the case that only the router one-hop away from the victim filters and drop 
all type A packets with probability P of 1, then the upstream link consumption C’ is as the 
following: 
C’ = (Na•Rb + Nn•Rg)•(I-1) + (Na•Rb• (1-P) + Nn• Rg) 
 
The values of C and C’ according to different values of Rb are shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Values of C and C’ in DDoS cases  
 Na =1 Na =10 Na =20 Na =30 Na =50 
Consumption 2395 3214 4124 5034 6854 




As we can see from Table 4.2, the ups tream bandwidth consumption is greatly saved in 
our mechanism by 29.23%, 217.8%, 339.48%, 417.16% and 510.65% when Na is 1, 10, 
20, 30 and 50 respectively. And the bigger scale of the distributed attack, larger 
percentage of link bandwidth is saved. Hence we can say our scheme works even better 
when the distributed denial of service is more intense on the metric of bandwidth 
consumption.  
4.3.5 Value Setting of the Tuning Parameter 
As we can see from the figures  and the tables listed in section 4.3.4, given a hig her value 
of the tuning parameter T, the HTF-DDoS mechanism can be propagated to a higher level 
in internet topology and the output of good packets are better. However, it doesn’t mean 
that the rule for us to set the value of T is the higher, the better. Sometimes, a smaller 
value is better than a bigger value. We should take into account the following two factors 
in setting a proper value: Firstly, the good packets are probably collateral dropped when 
the value of T is quite high. The big value of T makes the victim very sensitive in volume 
change of the attack streams, therefore a tiny change caused by the unstable status of 
internet or unstable bad packets transition rate can be detected and is wrongly looked as a 
sign of bad stream perturbing. Consequent ly, the link under test is identified as a bad link 
even it is a good one in fact and the good link will be rate-limited next. The bad 
consequence is that good packets coming from this link are dropped which increases false 
positive ratio of the HTF-DDoS mechanism. The performance of our mechanism is 
influenced. However, when the value of the tuning parameter T is not extremely  high, the 
tiny change brought by the environment is neglected and the false positive ratio is kept 
low. 
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Secondly, the cost effectiv eness is another key consideration when setting the value of T. 
We should take into account the cost of the implementation of link testing as well as the 
benefit we can get. As we have mentioned above, link testing itself is a kind of DDoS 
attack. It brings a short period of service-denial to the link under test, which affects 
internet availability.  Therefore we try not to conduct it unless it is avoidable. Our aim is 
to release the attack effect, so once the attack stream is constrained into an acceptable 
range, we can terminate the process. It is not necessary to trace all the way to the attacker 
as the attack may be effectively controlled already before we reaching the highest level of 
the Internet. We should consider the balance of pains and gains carefully and strive to get 
better result  with lower cost. It is always unnecessary to identify the links contributing a 
little and trace them to the top level. Instead, we should put the effort in stopping the main 
branches of an attack stream and terminate the HTF-DDoS process as soon as the attack 
is under control.  
When we set a value to the tuning parameter T, many factors should be considered and 
try to find the one fitting our current need best.  
4.3.6 Feasibility in Real Network  
In this simulation, we use a bin ary-tree as our network topology as we did in HTF-DoS 
simulation. When we implement the HTF-DDoS mechanism in the real network, the basic 
idea of the HTF-DDoS mechanism need not be changed. However, some details of the 
design need to be changed. We will explain them respectively. Firstly,  let us discuss the 
feasibility of our HTF-DDoS mechanism in the implementation in a random network 




Figure 4.21 Random Network Topology in DDoS Cases 
 
In this topology, w e have three attack sources which are A1, A2 and A3 respectively. And 
the rest of the components are non-attackers and routers which are marked as G and R 
respectively. The arrow line represents the attacking path.  
As we did in binary-tree situation, w e will test the links hop-by-hop. Firstly, we test the 
links in level 1 and identify R1-V and R2-V as attack links, then we test links in level 2 
and identify that R3-R1, R4-R2 and R5-R2 are bad links. Consequently, we test the links 
in level 3 and we find out that R5-R4 is an attack link and R5 is already been identified as 
the end of other attack link. The situation will not happen in a binary-tree or other tree 
topology while it tends to happen in non-tree topology.  In this situation, we will not filter 
the packets coming from R4-R5 immediately as we can get the same effect by filtering 
the packets coming from R7-R5 and R8-R5 in next step. Hence, the route that we 
propagate the filtering function is shown as figure 4.22 which is essentially a tree-
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topology. According to the explanation above, we can see it clearly that our HTF-DDoS 
mechanism which essentially propagate the mechanism in a tree-construction way works 
well in a random non-tree  
.  
Figure 4.22 Random Network Topology in DDoS Cases (con’t) 
 
topology. However, to implement the HTF-DDoS mechanism in real DDoS scenario, we 
need change the filtering signal generation functionality slightly.  
In our primary design of this functionality, we define the procedure of filtering signal 
generation based on the binary tree topology which is not feasible in non binary-tree 
construction. Hence we redefine it as follows. Suppose a link R1-R2’s nearer end and 
further end are R2, R1 from the side of the victim respectively. The direct downstream 
router of R2 is R3 from the side of the victim. We revise the procedure as follows. 
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Figure 4.23 Revised Signal Generation Procedure 
 
As we have already discussed in chapter 3, link testing itself is a kind of DoS attacks. 
When we apply it in DDoS scenarios, the problem becomes even more serious. In DDoS 
scenarios, there are more than one attacker, and hence, the number of suspicious links that 
we need to identify one by one is great. The time we may spend in identifying the bad 
links is expected to be much longer, which results in a more serious  damage brought by 
link testing. However, as we have discussed in chapter 3, there still exist the feasibility of 
the HTF-DDoS mechanism. Firstly, if the attack is expected to last even longer than the 
whole process time, the implementation of the HTF-DDoS mechanism is acceptable in a 
long run as the benefit is far beyond the damage. Our mechanism can improve the output 
of good packets greatly and also provide the information of the original attacking source 
which can help us catch the bad guy effectively. If the attack lasts for only a short time, 
For the link R1-R2 tested in the current step 
If the link is a bad one 
 If there are links whose nearer end is R2 remain untested  
    Send an ICMP filter-on packet for R2naimed at R1f 
Else  
Send an ICMP filter-on packet for R2 aimed at R1 
Send an ICMP filter-off packet for R3 aimed at R2 
Else 
 If there are links whose nearer end is R2 remain untested 
      Send an ICMP linktesting-off packet for R2 aimed at R1 
Send an ICMP linktesting-on packet for R2 to test other links  
Else  
     Send an ICMP filter-off packet for R3 aimed at R2 
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perhaps before we get the true source of the attacking stream, we need to consider the use 
of HTF-DDoS mechanism carefully as   mentioned in chapter 3 (please refer to section 
3.3). In addition, if the victim has enough knowledge to predict that the attacks are highly 
integrated instead of diversely distributed, we can reduce the scope of bad links searching. 
In this condition, the DDoS scenarios will not differ too much from the DoS scenarios. 
The feasibility of the HTF-DDoS mechanism is still up to our consideration.   
4.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we proposed an extended version of the HTF-DoS mechanism which is 
called the HTF-DDoS mechanism. Different from the HTF-DoS mechanism which is 
only practicable in DoS cases, the HTF-DDoS mechanism is feasible in DDoS cases.  
In the HTF-DDoS mechanism, the routers have the same functionality as those in the 
HTF-DoS mechanism but the victim is entitled with more complex functionality. In this 
chapter, a tuning parameter T is introduced to the HTF-DDoS mechanism. T is aimed to 
make a quantitative specification on how much change could be a sign of bad stream 
perturbing and we specify that only when the intensity of the attack stream after link 
testing is less than the value of T out of the intensity before link testing, the link under 
test is identified being on the attack path. Otherwise, the link under test is identified as a 
good one. The value of the tuning parameter T not only affects the victim’s sensitivity in 
bad link identification and also indirectly decides the highest level that the HTF-DDoS 
process can be propagated up to. By running extensive simulations on NS2, we have 
proved that a bigger value of T enables the victim be more sensitive in attack link 
identification and enables the HTF-DDoS process reach a higher level of the internet 
topology.  
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By extensive simulations on NS2, we also evaluate the performance of the HTF-DDoS 
mechanism. Simulation results show that our mechanism is able to drop 30% of bad 
packets at the start of the process and up to 100% when the traceback is completed 
whatever the scale of DDoS attacks and the value of T are. Our simulation also shows 
that the false positive ratio ranges from 15% to 0% at the beginning and end of the 
traceback-filtering process respectively. As a result, our mechanism can improve the 
throughput of legitimate packets greatly. Theoretical analysis shows that our mechanism 
can save link bandwidth consumption. For instance, when the number of attacker is 50, 
the link bandwidth consumption can be saved by more than 500 percent. And the link 




DoS/DDoS attacks aim to deny or limit the legitimate users’ access to a certain host or 
network. Based on the different objective of a DoS/DDoS attack, we can classify the 
attacks into two categories, namely flood attacks and logic or software attacks. In flood 
attacks, an Internet host is overwhelmed by a continuous flood of traffic designed to 
consume resources at the targeted server (CPU cycles and memory) and/or in the network 
(bandwidth and packet buffers). These attacks result in degraded service or a complete 
site shutdown.  While in software or logic  attacks, a small number of malformed packets 
are designed to exploit known software bugs on the target system. These attacks are 
relatively easy to counter either through the installation of software patches that eliminate 
the vulnerabilities or by adding specialized firewall rules to filter out malformed packets 
before they reach the target system. These attacks can cost the target a great deal of time 
and money. For instance, Yahoo, Buy.com and many other large commercial sites has 
been the target of DDoS  attacks and was out of service for several hours. Due to the grave 
threat to internet security that DoS/DDoS attacks have posed, many security efforts aim at 
exploiting a certain feature of current attacks to prevent them or to constrain their effect 
have been made recently. Generally the countermeasures are categorized into four folds: 
Prevention, Detection, Filtering and Traceback. Although those approaches can 
effectively defend against DoS/DDoS attacks to some extent, few address the issue of 
minimizing false positive ratio and link bandwidth consumption when the DoS/DDoS 
attack is raging on. 
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5.1 Contribution 
In this thesis, we propose a Hybrid Traceback-Filtering (HTF)-DoS  mechanism to use 
traceback to enhance packet filtering. In this scheme, the packet-dropping function at 
routers is recursively activated hop by hop using traceback. In so doing, the bandwidth 
consumption of upstream links  is reduced as compared to other proposals where only 
routers closest to the victim perform filtering. In HTF-DoS, we use controlled flooding to 
reconstruc t the attack path, and then filter packets only at the routers which are on the 
attack path. This minimizes the false positive ratio caused by imprecise filtering. To 
minimize the reaction delay against DoS attacks, packet-filtering and route-reconstructing 
are conducted simultaneously. Simulation results show that our mechanism is able to drop 
30% of bad packets at the start of the process and up to 100% when the traceback is 
completed. Our simulation also shows that false positive ratio ranges from 15% to 0% at 
the beginning and end of the traceback-filtering process respectively.  As a result, our 
mechanism can improve the throughput of legitimate packets. Theoretical analysis shows 
that our mechanism can save link bandwidth consumption. For instance, when the 
generation rate of bad packets is 500 times that of the good packets, the link bandwidth 
consumption can be saved by more than 56 percent. 
And to release the limitation of the HTF-DoS mechanism which is only practical in DoS 
cases, we extend the HTF-DoS mechanism to DDoS cases  and the new mechanism is 
named HTF-DDoS. We entitle the victim in DDoS cases with more responsibility than 
the one in DoS cases and keep the routers’ functionality unchanged. By extensive 
simulation results and theoretical analys is, we show that HTF-DDoS mechanism is 
effective in bad packet dropping, minimizing false positive ratio, improving throughput of 
good packets and saving link bandwidth consumption in DDoS cases as well as the HTF-
DoS mechanism does in DoS cases. Simulation results show that HTF-DDoS is able to 
drop 30% of bad packets at the start of the process and up to 100% when the traceback is 
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completed whatever the scale of the DDoS attacks and the value of the tuning parameter. 
Our simulation also shows that the false positive ratio ranges from 15% to 0% at the 
beginning and end of the traceback-filtering process respectively. As a result, our 
mechanism can improve the throughput of legitimate packets greatly. Theoretical analysis 
shows that our mechanism can save lin k bandwidth consumption. For instance, when the 
number of attacker is 50, the link bandwidth consumption can be saved by more than 500 
percent. And the link bandwidth can be more saved when the distributed denial of service 
is more intense. 
5.2 Future Work  
In our hybrid mechanism, controlled flooding is chosen as our traceback method that 
assists in identifying attack links. As we have mentioned in section 3, controlled flooding 
has many advantages over other traceback approaches, however, a great drawback of 
controlled flooding method is that itself  is a kind of DoS attacks . When flooding the links, 
even if the abrupt of stream is of a tiny period, there are still a lot of good packets will be 
affected by the artificial congestion. Fortunately, our mechanism succeeds in  minimiz ing 
the collateral damage on the good streams that may make up this drawback to some 
extent. There is a tradeoff between the benefits we may get from the HTF filtering and the 
bad effects brought by the HTF traceback. To strengthen the benefits brought by our 
hybrid mechanism, in the future we may focus on how to improve the Attack Path 
Identification Functionality of the victim. If the victim is able to identify a bad link within 
the minimum time, the period of artificial flooding can be minimized; therefore, less 
packets are influenced by the controlled flooding itself.  
More effectively filtering rules are expected in future. For instance, the setting of base 
values for each router should be considered more carefully. In our mechanism, the base 
value follows the simply linear function and more reliable exponential functions should 
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be employed to find out the ideal setting of base values.  
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